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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH

PAUL F. ROST,

I

PlaintiffRespondent,

.....

I
I

vs.

Civil No.

I

JANET L. ,ROST,

I

DefendantAppellant.

I
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Judgment of the 8Gnor .
Wahlquist and from Findings, Conclas '·
of Divorce of the Honorable Ronald o.
Second Judicial District Court. Weber·

SAMUEL KING, ESQ.
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH

P~UL

F. ROST,

I

PlaintiffRespondent,

I
I

vs.

Civil No. 15398

I

,JANET L. ROST I

I

DefendantAppellant.

I
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by the Plaintiff
and Respondent, Paul F. Rost, against the Defendant and
Appellant, Janet L. Rost.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At hearings prior to trial, the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist denied Appellant's Motion seeking abatement of the
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction in the State of
Utah in the trial of the above entitled matter, and also
seeking a stay of judicial proceedings allowing the State of
New York to proceed in an action in that jurisdiction.

An
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Interlocutory Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah and an Appeal on both Motions was denied by
this Honorable Court and the Judgment of the Lower Court
affirmed as to denial of plea in abatement and for stay of
judicial proceedings.
On February 17, 1978, the Honorable Ronald

o.

Hyde

granted a Decree of Divorce as between the parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Findings of Fact,
Judgment, and Decree of the Lower Court and Respondent seeks
reaffirmation of the Findings and Judgment of the Lower Court,
and further alleges that the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah erred in denying Appellant's Motion contesting jurisdictic
in Utah and abatement of proceedings in favor of New York, whi(
has previously been denied by this Honorable Court in the
Interlocutory Appeal.
Respondent has filed a Cross Appeal, alleging as error
the Judgment of the Lower Court in the amount and length of
the period of alimony granted to the Appellant, and as to the
requirement, that the Respondent pay one-half of all of the
children's tuition and one-half of the doctor bills, and furthc
alleges that the attorney's fees granted to the Appellant were
excessive.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant has filed with the Court 35 pages of Brief
and approximately 40 pages of Appendix to which the Respondent
will not respond in kind and Respondent requests that the Court
take equal notice of the whole record in addition to the specific
record which has been attached by the Appellant, so that the
Brief of Respondent is given equal consideration even though
it is of substantially less volume.
Respondent further objects to the Statement of Facts
of the Appellant, in that there are characterizations of motive
and intent, including conclusions as to such motive and intent,
and in addition, Statements of Fact are not properly attributed
by reference to record before the Court.
The Respondent is a Major in the United States Air Force
(R-187), claiming his previous legal state of residence to
be in Lubbock, Texas, and is stationed at Hill Air Force Base,
and has been a resident of the State of Utah for more then
one year (R-188), with domicile in Weber County.
A Complaint for divorce was filed.by the Respondent
on April 16, 1977, in the Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County,

(R-3) and service was made by the Appellant on

a Decree of Divorce filed in the State of New York seeking
Judgment on the New York Decree of Divorce and was served upon
the Respondent August 18, both years being the year of 1977.
(R-200)
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The Respondent has acted as Flight Officer in the United
States Air Force and was assigned to Udorn Air Base in Thailand
in 1975, and was compelled prior to departing for Thailand
to attend Georgia Air Force Base in California from February 20
to May 7 for transition into F-4 Air9raft, and at the time
of being assigned was a resident and domiciled in the State
of Texas.

(R-200)

The Respondent was raised in New York and graduated
from a school in New Jersey in 1962, leaving home in 1962 to
qo to Florida where he was employed by an aircraft company

and has never lived in the State of New York since that time,
except for visits to both the Appellant's parents and the Respoi
parents and spent only the month of May in 1976, two weeks
in May of 1975, and a leave of absence in 1976 in New York

(R-2~.

Respondent resided in Utah since June of 1976 (R-201), and
has filed a request to be retained at Hill Air Force Base for
introduction of the F-16 Fighter (R-201) and could be assigned
as a Squadron Commander with that aircraft and hopes to be
allowed to stay at least three more years in Utah and has expres:
a desire to retire in the Utah area upon completion of his
Air Force career.

(R-202)

The Appellant moved to New York with the two children
from the Texas domicile to be near her parents and relatives
(R-339), and subsequently consulted an attorney in New York

-4-
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for the purpose of drafting a written agreement of separation
which is subscribed to by the Respondent and the Appellant,
and if in fact the parties lived apart pursuant to a Decree of
Judgment of Separation for a period of one or more years could
then obtain a Decree of Divorce under the laws of the State of
New York.

(R-196)

The Respondent subscribed to the Separation Agreement,
in that the Appellant stated that she would not move to Utah
unless the Respondent agreed to subscribe to the agreement.
(R-275)

The Respondent subscribed to the agreement after

determining that in his own mind there was no doubt that if
he did not sign the agreement or if he fought it or had argued
for changes in the agreement, that there was no way he could
save his marriage. (R-275}

The Respondent did not desire the

dtvorce and induced his wife, the Appellant, to attend with
him a marriage counselor group prior to subscribing to the
agreement. (R-270)

The Appellant came with Respondent to

Utah on a Friday and left the following Monday (R-274).
The Honorable Ronald

o.

Hyde in his Memorandum Decision

made determination, that the Courts for the State of Utah and
the Courts in New York are not absolutely bound by any agreement
entered into by and between the parties prior to divorce where
the agreement is a Separation Agreement made under the laws of

the State of New York, and that the Court has equitable jurisdiction
-5-
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to make such Findings as are necessary between the parties.
(R-1001
The Court granted to the Appellant the sum of $350.00
per month alimony until the end of August, 1978, and then the
sum of $200.00 a month alimony for a_period of two and onehalf years from September, 1978, subject to termination upon
the Appellant's remarriage or her having an income of $800.00
a month, whichever is reached first, and in addition, awarded
$200.00 a month per child as child support to be increased
upon the termination of the alimony to $225.00 per month child
support, and further providing that such child support shall
continue until the children reach the age of 18, unless they
continue their education, which in that event shall continue
until the children have reached the age of 21, or become selfsupporting, with all of the property and debt distribution
allowed as set out in the Separation Agreement, and the Court
further awarded to the Appellant the sum of $1,500.00 as and
for attorney's fees.

(R-101}

The additional liabilities of the Respondent and award
to the Appellant by reason of the Court's authorizing the proper:
and debt distribution of the "Separation Agreement" to be incluc:
.in the Decree of Divorce imposes the following liabilities upon

the Respondent or a possible interpretation of such agreement
imposing (R-101) :

-6-
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1. Maintenance of benefits under the Civil Health and
Medical Program of the Uniform Services for all medical
den~al, .hospitali:ation, surgical expenses, including '
medications, .nursing care, necessary appliances, psychiatric
or psychological treatment, and cosmetic treatment if
occasioned by a traumatic episode.
2.
Any medical or dental expenses not covered under
the Champus Military Program shall be divided equally
between husband and wife.
·
3.
The Respondent shall be responsible for any
security deposit required on any apartment obtained
by the Appellant.
4. The Respondent to be liable for the payment of
any utility deposits required to be placed by the
Appellant.
5.
The Respondent is compelled to pay to the Appellant
the sum of $1,200.00 within thirty days after signing
of the Stipulation Agreement to represent one-half of
the value of a 1970 travel trailer and a 1971 Chevrolet
stationwagon.
6.
The Respondent to be obligated to pay to the
Appellant's attorney one-half of the fees for the
Separation Agreement and the right of the Appellant
to seek payment of all attorney's fees resulting from
any breach of the Separation Agreement by the Respondent.
7. A specific agreement between the parties, that if
an action of divorce is brought, that each party shall
be responsible for their own counsel fees.
8.
The Respondent to pay one-half of the Post
Off ice Credit Union loan made by the Appellant and
proceeds of same received by her.
9.
The Respondent to pay one-half of the loan to
Reese Credit Union.
10. The Respondent to have all obligation of paying
all such other remaining debts and obligations for
which the Appellant is responsible.
11. The Appellant be awarded all household goods,
furniture, kitchen items, bedding, jewelry, antiques,
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and items of personalty and personal property belonglli.g to the Appellant and the children. (R-8-36)
The Appellant will be graduated from College in August,
1978, with a Bachelor Decree (R-333), has $50.00 a week income
from part-time employment (R-341) .
The base pay of the Respondent. is $1,698.60 a month
and at time of trial had received an increase for cost of livinc
in the amount of $94.00 a month, a quarters allowance for as
long as he lives off the Base for $301. 80, which will be forfeit
if he is compelled to live on the Base voluntarily or by the
discretion of the Commanding Officer of the Base at which the
Re.spondent is stationed, a rations allowance for $59. 53 a month,
flight pay for as long as he is medically qualified to fly

ll1. the amount of $245.00 a month, making a maximum total of
$2r304.93 a month,

(R-277) less federal income tax of $433.60

per month and F.I.C.A. of $99.00 a month, leaving a net takehome pay after insurance and other deductions of $1,771.00
a month (R-281), provided that the Respondent is living off
the Base and qualified to continue to receive $301.80 of the
aforesaid gross income, and further provided that the Commanding
Officer does not at his own discretion decide that the Responder.:
should live on Base, and further subject to reduction of $245.0~
a month if the Respondent should become medically not qualified
to fly.

(R-277)

-8-
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The obligations remaining to be paid by the Respondent
in accordance with the Agreement of Separation is in the amount
of $5,400.69.

(R-146)

In addition, the Respondent has the

obligation of paying the Appellant's attorney the sum of
$1,500.00 plus $27.00 in Court costs (R-151).
The budget of the Respondent evidence the minimal budget
providing for a monthly expense to the Respondent in the
sum of $1,451.00, without the inclusion therein of alimony,
child support, Appellant's attorney's fees, and Court costs,
nor the costs of Respondent's attorney's fees.

(Pl.Ex.l)

Respondent's mode of transportation is a 1971 Chevrolet
with a 102,000 miles on it (R-282) and is in need of $440.00
in repairs (R-283).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S
PLEA IN ABATEMENT OF THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS, IN THAT
JURISDICTION WAS PROPER IN THE UTAH COURTS.
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist ordered the Appellant
to proceed to trial and denied the plea of abatement, in that
the Utah Court had jurisdiction and was not estopped by reason
of the "Separation Agreement", as was subscribed to in the
State of New York, and affirmed jurisdiction to the Utah Court,
(R-55) after the court listened to testimony as to the residence
-9-:-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be sufficient to base a presumption, that the evidence before
the Court was sufficient to warrant jurisdiction to the Courts
of Utah in this matter.
In the matter of Lyerla v.

Lyerla, Supreme Court of

Kansas, 195 Ks. 250, 403 P.2d 989, the wife secured a divorce
from the husband with the wife being given custody of the
minor children, allowing visitations during the summer to
the father and weekend visitation privileges.

Subsequently,

the mother was given permission to remove the children to
Las Vegas, Nevada, and compelled to post a bond to guarantee
compliance with the Orders of the Court, and the husband was
allowed to visit his children in Nevada four days of each
quarter upon giving notice.

The father brought an action in

the Nevada Courts to obtain custodial rights previously
established by the Kansas Court and an Order was entered by
the Nevada Court on a Motion by the wife confirming existing
custody rights and changing dates for the 1963 summer visits
and raising support payments.

Upon the minor son being sent

by the mother to the Elsinore Naval Military School in
California for the 1963-1964 school year, the husband filed a
Motion in the Nevada Courts to change the son's custody and
the Motions by the husband and the wife were continued until
an appropriate date.

The husband had the minor son visiting

with him in Kansas for the two summer months and filed the

-12-
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Motion in the Kansas Court seeking a change of the child's
custody.

The Lower Court granting the Order and granting to

the wife visitation rights.

The Kansas Supreme Court held

in an action in this State (Kansas) is not subject to abatement
because of the pendency in anothar state of an action for the
same relief.
In Omar v. Omar, 108 Ks. 95, 193 P.2d 1094, the Court
held:
The pendency of an action for divorce in another
State is not a bar, nor a cause of stay of proceedings, in a similar action between the same parties
in thi.s State, where a Court of this State has
attained jurisdiction of the Defendant by service
of Summons.
In the instant matter before the Court, the action of
the Respondent was filed in April, 1977,

(R-3) and the Complaint

of the Appellant was not served until August, 1977, (R-200),
and by stipulation there was never a final adjudication of
the matter before the Court of the State of New York.

(R-72)

In Upton v. Heiselt Construction Company, 3 Ut.2d 170,
280 P.2d 971, The Supreme Court of Utah, March 9, 1955, the
Court could not accept the principle, that where there are
two actions between the same parties based upon the same
cause of action and two different courts, even if they do
not co-exist, stating:
1. Such contention assumes that the Colorado
Court was the first Court to acquire jurisdiction
-13-
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of the matter, when the fact is that the Utah
Court first assumes such jurisdiction, justifying
the conclusion, that applying Plaintiff's own test,
the Utah Court had jurisdiction to deal with a
Judgment, including the stay of execution thereof.
2. That although Plaintiff's contention, that
the two identical actions between the same parties
cannot co-exist in different courts generally is
true, there is an established exception thereto
when such actions are initiated first in one State
then in another, or in a State Court then in a
Federal Court or vice versa, in which cases it is
held generally, that although the first action filed
should be pursued to finality, such identical actions
can co-exist in different states or in a State in a
Federal Court, provided, however, that a Judgment in
one may be pleaded in bar or in abatement to the
other.
In Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wa.App.

370, 475 P.2d 571, the

Court of Appeals of Washington, October 13, 1970.

In this

matter the Plaintiff and Defendant were parties wherein an
action of an Interlocutory Decree of Separate Maintenance was
sought after each of the parties had initiated separate divorce
actions in the State of Rhode Island.

The husband abandoned

his action so that the wife could obtain the Interlocutory
Decree, which provided for payment of support for the wife
and children and disposition of personal and real property
and awarded custody of the children to the wife.

The husband

was a Navy Lieutenant Commander and was transferred to California
while the wife continued to reside in their Rhode Island home.
The Commander was thereafter ordered to attend a naval school
in Oak Harbor, Washington.

The Commander thereafter, one year
-14-
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and three weeks after his first arrival in Oak Harbor, filed

an action for divorce.

The spouse challenging the Court's

jurisdiction and moving for abatement of his action on the
grounds, that an action for divorce was pending in Rhode Island
court.

The Superior Court of Island:County in Washington did

grant the divorce to the husband making a determination that
it possessed jurisdiction.

The spouse as the Appellant assigned

error to the Trial Court's denial of the.Motion to Dismiss the
Respondent's Complaint, alleging that because the divorce was
pending in Rhode Island, that a Washington Court must abate
a subsequent divorce action commenced in the State of Washington.
The Court held:
Her claim is without merit, for the pendency of
a prior action in one state is not a ground for
abating subsequent action in this state. The
Court holding further, that an abatement of an
action can be had only where a matter is pending
before another court of the same jurisdiction, and
in that event, one of the actions must be abated.
POINT II
AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN A HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE EVENT OF A SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE IS
AN POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT AND IS NOT BINDING UPON
THE COURT.
The Agreement entered into by and between the Appellant
and the Respondent was planned by the wife, the Appellant
herein, when she saw her attorney two days prior to the return

ot

the Respondent from his tour of duty in Thailand, (R-129).
~1s-
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The Agreement was forced upon the Respondent on the basis of
fiat delivered by the wife, that unless the Respondent subscribe:
to the agreement, she would seek a divorce. (R-269)
The Respondent did not wish a divorce and induced his
wife to attend a marriage counseling-group with him and did
not want to go to his new assigrunent in Utah without his wife
and signed the "Separation Agreement" in order to avoid a divorc:
action. (R-270 - 275)

The Respondent was further induced to

sign by reason of the statement made by the wife's attorney
to the Respondent, that he would not be bound by the Agreement
by the New York Court, in that it could be modified if necessary
by the Court. (R-276)
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde stated that the Agreement
was a stipulation and was not a binding contract in the State
of Utah (R-386), and further stated:
In the State of New York, it is grounds for
divorce as I understand it to live under a
Separation Agreement for a period of one year.
We do not have that grounds. (R-387)
The Court further stated:
In this State, a Stipulation is just that.
It
is a tentative agreement. If approved, then
it becomes binding, it is not binding on the
Court and that's why I changed some of it. (R-387)

Xt should be noted at the outset the specific law of
the State of New York under which the Separation Agreement
was first drafted wherein the laws of the State of New York,
-16-
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Section 170 thereof, provides as follows:
An action fo~ divorce may be maintained by a

husband ?r wife t? procure a Judgment divorcing
the parties and dissolving the marriage on any
of the following grounds:
(5)
The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a Decree or Judgment of Separation for
a period of one or more years after the granting
of such Decree or Judgment, and satisfactory proof
has been submitted by the Plaintiff, that he or
she has substantially performed all of the terms
and conditions of such Decree or Judgment.
This citation is contained in the unsealed envelope
on page 140 of record, which was submitted by the Appellant
to the Court and is part of the record in this matter.
The attention of the Court is called to the fact, that
the (5) specifically provides that the parties have lived
apart for a period of one or more years after the granting of
such Decree or Judgment of Separation, and that in the instant
matter before the Court, the action was not pursued in the
State of New York and there was no Judgment, and in addition
thereto, the Appellant and Respondent lived together as husband
and wife subsequent to the subscribing to the Agreement as
set forth in the record.

(R-369)

All of the citations of the Appellant in reference to
the New York cases are not in point with the issues attempted
to be stated by the Appellant, but that the New York case of
Christian v. Christian, Court of Appeals of New York, 42 N.Y.2d
63, 365 N.E.2d 849, June 9, 1977, is specifically contrary to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the allegations of the Appellant.

The Court stated:

Marriage being a status with which a State is
deeply concerned, a Separation Agreement subjected
to attack are tested carefully.
A Court of equity does not limit its inquiry to
the ascertainment of the fact what has taken place
would, as between other persons~ have constituted
a contract, and give relief, as a matter of course,
if a formal contract be established, but it further
inquires whether the contract between husband and
wife was just and fair, and equitably sought to be in
force, and administers relief for both the contract
and the circumstances required.
The Court of Appeals ref erred to the provisions of
paragraph 5 and 6 of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966, wherein
the State of New York abandoned its position, wherein adultery
was the sole ground for absolute divorce, stated that paragraph
(5) of the Statute is called a conversion divorce, in that
they permit the conversion of a judicial separation decree or
separation agreement into an absolute divorce decree.

It

further stated, that in order to enforce such a separation
agreement:.
That the Plaintiff has complied with its terms and
that the parties have lived apart pursuant to the
document for the statutory period.
The Court further cited, that although written separation
agreement is a sine qua non to a divorce, it is evidentiary
in nature and admissible under the General Rules of Evidence,

and the Court would allow proof independent of the agreement
to be admissible on the question of whether or not the parties
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actually lived separate and apart for at least one year.
The Court further stated that:
There is a strict surveilance of all transactions
between married persons, especially separation
agreements, ***equities so zealous in this respect
that a separation agreement may be set aside on
'
grounds that would be insufficient to vitiate an
ordinary contract.
The Court further cited cases to the affect in making
its ruling here in the instant case cited, that it stated:
These principles in mind, Courts have thrown
their cloak of protection about separation
agreements and made it their business, when
confronted, to see to it that they are arrived
at fairly and equitably, in a manner so as to
be free from taint or fraud and duress, and
to set aside or refuse to enforce those borne of
and subsisting in inequity.*** To warrant
equities intervention, no actual fraud may be
shown, for relief will be granted if the settlement manifestly unfair to his spouse because of
the others overreaching.
The application of the laws of the State of New York
have no bearing directly in the instant matter before the
Court, in that Utah has no like statute as to separation
agreements and has provided grounds for divorce of a much
broader basis than the laws of the State of New York, and
a Court in the State of Utah that enters into making a decision
as to the rights, duties, and obligations of the husband and
wife is acting as a Court of equity and is not morally nor
legally bound to accept what is in affect an post-nuptial
agreement as between the parties, particularly as evidenced
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in the instant matter before the Court where the Respondent

desired to save his marriage and as an alternative to outright
divorce, sought a reconciliation by seeking marriage conseling
with the Appellant (R-270), and sought to reconcile their
differences by subscribing to the agreement so that the Appellan:
would accompany the Respondent to his new duty station in
Utah. (R-275)
The wife's seeking the advice of an attorney in the
drafting of a separation agreement two days before the
Respondent's return from a year's duty in Thailand and her
refusing to bring the children with her to Utah or their
furniture (R-339}, but arriving in Utah on Friday and leaving
the following Monday to return to New York (R-274}, are not
in affirmation of the good faith reconciliation by the

.Appellant with the Respondent.
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, in commenting on the
"Separation Agreement", stated in reference wherein he stated:
And I can't, for the life of me, believe that
New York would take the same position that it is
binding upon that Court when on the face of it,
it is just non-liveable. It puts a person in a
position that he can't live with it, and it is a
foolish agreement, not within the bounds of equity.
(R-377)
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah ruled in Pearson
v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080:
It is the Court's prerogative to make whatever
disposition of property, including the rights in
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such contract, as it deems fair, equitable, and
necessary for the protection and welfare of the
parties. The Court need not necessarily abide by
the terms of the litigant's Stipulation, and although
such should be respected in giving great weight, the
Court is not duty bound to carry over the terms thereof.
The Court further stated in reference to the right of
the Court in considering a Stipulation between the parties:
It is also noted that the Trial Judge has considerable
latitude of discretion in the disposition of property
and his Judgment should not be changed lightly, and
in fact not at all, unless it works such a manifest
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of
discretion.
In the instant matter before the Court, the husband,
who is the Respondent in the matter before this Court, signed
the Agreement prepared by the wife with her attorney_ even prior
to the return of the Respondent from his tour of duty overseas
in Thailand (R-129), and signed the Agreement in order to avoid
a divorce action (R-270,-275), and the Separation Agreement
clearly was instrumental in the separation and divorce of the
parties, Respondent and Plaintiff.
In Dawley v. Dawley, 131 Cal.Rpt. 3, 551 P.2d 323
(June, 1976), the Supreme Court of California stated that
California Courts have uniformly held, that contracts and the
State policy favoring marriage only insofar as the terms of
the contract do not "facilitate", "encourage", or "promote"
divorce or dissolutions.
In Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Ut.2d 315, 422 P.2d
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534, January, 1967, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the
Trial court could ignore a stipulation, and in doing so, the
court would not be acting in excess of or without jurisdiction,
and the Court has no obligation to accept a stipulation,
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES TO
THE APPELLANT - IN GRANTING ALIMONY TO THE APPELLANT
FOR THE AMOUNT AND PERIOD INVOLVED - COMPELLING
PAYMENT OF ONE-HALF CHILDREN'S TUITION THROUGH AGE
OF 21 - IN ORDERING PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL COSTS OF
ONE-HALF OF DOCTOR BILLS.
In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192,
this Court stated:
The Court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their
economic resources so that the parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis.
In doing so, it is necessary for the Court to
consider, in addition to the relative guilt or
innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of
the attendant facts and circumstances; the duration
of the marriage; the age of the parties; their
social position and standards of living; their
health; considerations relative to children; the
money and property they possess and how it was
acquired; their capability and training and their
present and potential income.
In the instant matter before the Court, the awarding
of $350.00 a month alimony to the Appellant, together with
$400.00 support for the two children, and the continuation of
the alimony after August by the payment of $200.00 to the
Appellant for an additional period of two and one-half years,
and the continuation of support for the children for $450.00
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a month, plus the payment of one-half of the children's tuition;
one-half of the doctor bills; $1,500.00 to the Appellant's
attorney; together with all of the property and debt distributions set out in the Separation Agreement,

(R-100,-101) the

payment of $5,400.00 of debts by-the Respondent is manifestly
not a just and equitable adjustment of the economic resources
as to the Respondent.

(R-145,-149)

The wife is a college graduate, and there is no
evidence in the entire trial record of any infirmities of the
wife, the Appellant herein.
The wife was obviously not too distraught by the pending
action of divorce, in that she was accompanied to the trial
by a male friend, who also loaned her money for the trip and
with whom she admitted she was dating at time of.trial, admitted
that when the Respondent called her in New York between 11:00
and 1:00 o'clock at night, the Respondent was only able to
reach her by talking to her at the home of her male friend
and she has often had Sunday dinner at her male friend's home
(R-357,-358).
The Respondent testified that he had not been selected
for promotion at the last Promotion Board in August, and that
the failure to be so promoted (R-290) , and it would be a
year and one-half before the Board would meet again and that
when an officer of the Respondent's status does not make the
Board for promotion at the first time selection, chances go
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down drastically, "less than five percent and probably about
one percent", and it is unlikely that he will be promoted,
and the failure to obtain promotion also means that the Responde:
would be required to retire at not more then 21 years of service,
(R-291)
The Respondent has provided for the medical care of
the minor children, in that they are covered under the Champus
Program of the Air Force, wherein 80 percent of the costs of
all medical care after deduction of the first $100.00 of costs
is provided for the children.

(R-291)

Prior to the Respondent leaving for his tour of duty
in Thailand and the Appellant moving to New York, the home
of the parties in Texas was sold (R-372), most of the debts
were paid off, and the Appellant was given $5,000.00 which
was first put into her checking account in the Spring of 1976
and all of the money was gone by the time the Respondent arrived
home from Thailand,

(R-369)

The Respondent's pay check went

directly to the Appellant from which she would send him $300.00
a month. (R-374)
The Stipulation Agreement further provides that the
Respondent shall be responsible for any security deposit requirei
on any apartment obtained by the Appellant, and that the Respond£
also agrees to pay for any utility deposits required.

(R-27)

The Respondent already having made a deposit on the premises
-24-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

used by the Appellant at the time of trial in the amount of
$370.00 (R-348).

Such provision for the paying of deposits

upon any apartments selected by the Appellant is manifestly
unjust and conscionable.
The Court incorporated the Agreement by reference except
- to minor modification due to the inequity of the Agreement
as to its provisions for alimony and child support (R-147),
and it is the contention of the Respondent, that the Court
in rendering its Judgment provided that the Respondent pay

/

to the Appellant $1,500.00 attorney fees, even though the Agreement
between the parties, that the Court chose to incorporate but
modify, provided that each of the parties pay their own costs
in the event of a divorce action as between the parties.
In accordance with Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359
(Nov., 1974), Supreme Court of Utah, this Court has held that
the burden is on the Appellant to prove that evidence clearly
preponderates against the Findings as made and that there was
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial prejudicial error where a serious inequity has
resulted so as to manifest clear abuse of discretion.
This Court further stated in Hendricks v. Hendricks,
63 P.2d 277 (Dec., 1936), that an appeal on the propriety of
the Judgment of the Lower Court as to alimony, the Court is
required to reveal the evidence in the nature of a trial de novo
on the record and to submit it to the Court.

The excess

generosity of the Lower Court in the award which was made to
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the Appellant was induced substantially by the Court believing
that the contract referred to as the "Separation Agreement"
was "under your New York Statute, I suppose it is basically
acceptable"

(R-379), and that the error of the Court in making

minor modifications as to a reduction of the liability of the
Respondent as set forth in the Separation Agreement was
erroneously based upon the concept, that the Separation

Agreeme~

was an untouchable document in the State of New York, which
as has been previously set forth in the citation of Christian
v. Christian, supra, has been held by the Circuit Court of
Appeals of New York as not an untouchable instrument and one
in which the Court has substantial leeway and is not bound
thereby.
In addition, it is submitted to the Court, that the
Respondent is further entitled to reimbursement for the allowable costs of the Appeal and attorney fees necessitated by
reason of the Appeal of the Appellant, which has substantially
increased the costs of the Respondent.
Barraclough v. Barraclough, 111 P.2d 792

This Court held in
(Apr., 1941), the

Court held when it affirmed the Judgment of the Lower Court,
that there was no basis for modifying the Decree and held against
the Appellant, that the Respondent had incurred allowable costs
that the Respondent would be entitled to reimbursement for
the same from Appellant.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the socalled "Separation Agreement" entered into in the State of
New York and wherein no Court action was undertaken to make
such Separation Agreement an order of any Court of the State
of New York, that the Agreement was a stipulation in form and
was in effect an post-nuptial agreement which was subject to
modification and was so modified by the Lower Court using the
equity and discretion of the Court in final Judgment rendered
by the Lower Court, and further, that there can be no question

I

I

that the Lower Court had jurisdiction and that such a jurisdiction cannot be in deprivation of the right of the Respondent,
who was domiciled in the State of Utah, from filing an action
of divorce in the State of Utah, in that the so-called "Separation
Agreement" did not deprive the Utah Courts of its jurisdiction
to hear the action brought before it and there was no right
of abatement as to the Appellant in favor of the State of New
York.
DATED this

_lj_

day of August, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

j

d

-, -------- ~

~ -- - ?;/,£-/7.. /-~
p;<~~r;:/-:2....-:2....
l>ETE N. VLAHOS
.
Attorney for Respondent
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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